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Printed in GermanyForeign banks are institutions that operate
with foreign capital in Germany. They are 
usually staffed with predominantly German
nationals, their management teams are 
either of mixed nationalities or just German.
Very often,foreign banks do not act as univer-
sal  banks but rather specialize in certain 
products like trade finance, consumer credit,
investment banking, transaction, processing
services etc.
The number of foreign banks in Germany -
subsidiaries and branches - grew by 11 from
162 in 2004 to 173 in 2005 - the peak was 183
banks in 1994. This increase occurred despite
the ongoing active merger market and 
consolidation process in the financial services
industry. According to recent figures released
by the Association of Foreign Banks the
foreign banks in Germany employ around
20.000 people. The size of its members 
ranges from 4 to 7.000 people.The number of
employees increased by approximately 5% in
2005, thus defying the trend among German
banks to reduce the number of employees.
Part of the growth happened in the area of
new products like asset management, custo-
dian business, investment banking, direct
banking etc.
An important measure is market share. By
looking at selected areas of businesses the
market share of foreign banks is big and 
growing. Some of the growth happened
because of a growing market, some of it is
taking away market share from domestic
competitors!
Take  the number of banks operating at
the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FWB) on 
the Xetra Platform: Foreign banks represent
46% of the total banks. Their share in turno-
ver at the Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse grew
from 36% in 2004 to 49% in 2005.The market
share at Eurex is even bigger and reached 
85% of total turnover in 2005.
The bond market is largely dominated 
by foreign banks. The new issue statistics 
contain only two German banks among the
ten market leaders.The same can be observed
on the equity side, where only three of the
most active ten banks are German. Auctions
for  German Government Papers see foreign
banks as major participants: out of the fifteen
leading banks eleven are foreign. In some
cases a foreign bank is even the market leader.
The number of mandates in the German 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) business
lead by foreign banks is big: Seven of the 
leading ten banks are foreign, the market
leader is Deutsche Bank.
On top of providing additional jobs, foreign
banks blend cultures,introduce new products
and processes,increasing the professionalism
of the market place,and offer interesting and
attractive career opportunities both inside
and outside of Germany. Foreign banks also
offer different experiences from other 
markets and regulatory environments, thus 
enriching the knowledge base of Frankfurt.
Their decision making process and organiza-
tional structure may be different, too.
Ensuring the quality of the Finanzplatz
Frankfurt, foreign banks contribute a lot to
the outstanding regional position of Frankfurt
in the centre of Continental Europe. The
foreign banks also could (and are) using the
location of Frankfurt as an efficient hub for
Central and Eastern Europe, i.e. take 
advantage of two factors: The logistics 
infrastructure of Frankfurt and the knowled-
ge base of bankers who have a wealth of
experience in banking with that region.These
two factors and the export oriented structure
of the German economy make Frankfurt to a
domestic as well as an international banking
place anyway.
The existing labor pool of Germany also 
provides many people being very well educa-
ted and skilled in operational services. This
enables foreign banks to run efficient and
safe operations in areas like clearing, settle-
ment, credit work etc. These areas are also
supported in Frankfurt by excellent business
schools. Frankfurt has a concentration of
more universities than any other financial
centre.
The mix of talents and cultures described
above is a great challenge and chance for 
one of the most important projects of the
region: the building of the House of Finance
at Frankfurt University. The traditionally 
close ties between business and academia 
in the Anglo-Saxon world should provide 
useful additional guidance for such a project
through foreign banks.
It can be clearly stated that all banks and
investors benefit from the services and skills
of the first class operator Deutsche Börse.
But Deutsche Börse as well benefits from the
input and international experiences of 
foreign banks,particularly investment banks.
Finally institutions like the European Central
Bank and the Deutsche Bundesbank as well
as the regulatory body of the European
Insurance industry contribute importantly to
the character of the financial centre, both
directly and indirectly through attracting
national and international attention as well
as talents in various professions.
The financial centre is blessed with an effi-
cient infrastructure, a great blend of people
and cultures, an excellent skill-set of people
and an unique central geographical location.
Foreign banks provide a great enrichment to
the place and take advantage of a great place!
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Foreign Banks and Standort Frankfurt
Dr.Lutz Raettig,Chairman of the board,
Morgan Stanley Bank AG,and – as a representative
of foreign banks – member of the board of the
Association of German banks04 researchreport
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Introduction
The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
(MiFID), representing the centerpiece of the
EU Financial Service Action Plan, is intended
to foster investor protection as well as market
efficiency.For these purposes MiFID addresses
the following key issues:
• a new classification of trading venues
into Regulated Markets, Multilateral
Trading Facilities (MTFs) – the EU pendant
of Electronic Communication Networks
(ECNs) in the US – and Systematic 
Internalizers
• requirements for Best Execution on a
European level,and
• the introduction of extensive transpa-
rency regulations for OTC trading which
is new e.g.for Germany.
The venue classification of MiFID is intended to
establish a level playing field between execu-
tion mechanisms, to foster service and price
competition as well as to assure that investors
have a choice on execution venues. On the
basis of setting up an individual “Best Execu-
tion Policy”investment firms are supposed to
realize the best possible result for customer
orders. Off-exchange transactions have to be
published as close to real-time as possible. In
response to these major regulatory changes
the financial industry in Europe is supposed to
establish adequate processes and systems to
comply with the new standards.This study is
intended to investigate the preparation status
of the German financial industry in February
2006,i.e.21 months before MiFID takes effect.
Furthermore it shall provide an overview of
the attitude of investment firms towards the
central topics of MiFID and provide a basis for
firms to benchmark their own preparation
status relative to other investment firms.
Data Sample
The survey „Die Umsetzung der MiFID in der
deutschen Finanzindustrie“ (Implementation
of MiFID in the German financial industry)
was carried out in February 2006, including
193 investment firms consisting of the 100 lar-
gestfinancial institutions as well as the market
participants of the three major German
exchanges.For sound results five pretests were
undertaken before investment firms were
identified by phone that agreed to pass the
survey.Finally a 28.5% rate of return (55 firms)
was achieved.
Preparation levels and project status
Inhomogeneity of preparation levels – The
analysis of the responses reveals a high vari-
ance in preparation levels among the German
investment firms.About 42% of the companies
are currently involved in collecting further
information about MiFID,whereas 44% of the
respondents are already aware of its core con-
tents. Further 14% assess their familiarity
with the new regulation to be very well.More
than half of the investment firms have alrea-
dy started to prepare their activities for a
MiFID implementation. Among the already
undertaken preparations, the analysis of the
implications on internal business processes as
well as on IT systems dominates for 48% of
the firms.At the same time merely 29% of the
responding investment firms are investigating
the implications of MiFID on their business
strategies.
Cost estimates surprisingly low – The majority
(80%) of the surveyed investment firms esti-
mate total one-off implementation costs for
MiFID readiness to be lower than 1mn € (see
figure 1.a). These estimates are clearly below
the already publicly available and discussed
cost estimates. Another 15.6% of German
investment firms estimate the costs to lie
between 1 and 5mn €.Only 4.4% expect costs
above 20mn €. Among these results it is stri-
king that the estimates of large investment
firms do not show consistent patterns.
Instead they are distributed among the diffe-
rent cost classes. The main cost driver is
Is the German financial industry
ready for MiFID?
EUROPEAN REGULATION IN SECURITIES TRADING WILL UNDERGO MASSIVE
CHANGES WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MIFID.THIS STUDY INVESTIGATES INTO
THE READINESS FOR MIFID AND THE EXPECTATIONS OF THE GERMAN FINANCIAL
INDUSTRY 21 MONTHS BEFORE THESE CHANGES TAKE EFFECT IN NOVEMBER 2007.
PETER GOMBER CLAUDIA REININGER
MARKUS GSELL BARTHOLOMÄUS ENDE
Figure 1: The left chart presents the estimations of overall one-off MiFID implementation costs,on the right the
expected lead times for the implementation are shown.
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Timely implementation expected – In February
2006, the majority of surveyed investment
firms assesses that the implementation of all
MiFID requirements is achievable in less than
18 months (see figure 1.b). Only 16.7% of the
companies expect the implementation to take
longer. Among the respondents only 32% have
already undergone a budget planning process
for MiFID implementation. The companies
that already have more concrete budget plans
are allocating the budgets primarily for 2007.
Competitive potential and assessment of key
MiFID topics
MiFID is seen as a regulatory obligation rather
than as a strategic chance – Best Execution
plays a key role in MiFID and offers investment
firms a chance for differentiation. Another
area where firms see potential for new com-
petitive moves is the provision of new services
for professional clients (see figure 2).But ove-
rall,the industry does not see much potential
for competition that can be derived from the
implementation of MiFID. Especially, invest-
ment firms do not see a business opportunity
in the marketing of their own post trade data
although MiFID allows providing post trade
data on a commercial basis and via self selec-
ted data distribution channels. Furthermore,
most companies have not selected a distribu-
tion channel yet.
Self assessment of firms concerning the criteria
for classification as Systematic Internalizers –
In the draft Level 2 implementing measures,
the EU Commission defines four criteria for a
classification of investment firms as Systematic
Internalizers. Among the respondents of the
study 55.1% possess rules as well as business
processes supporting an execution of client
orders against their own account (criterion 1).
Furthermore,40.8% provide personal or auto-
mated systems for executing customer orders
against their own trading books (criterion 2).
26.5% of the investment firms assess them-
selves to provide this service to clients on a 
regular basis (criterion 3) and for 14% of res-
ponding firms, execution of customer orders
against own account has a material commer-
cial role (criterion 4).
Expansion of transparency rules is not desired
– The transparency requirements of MiFID
will apply to equities only with the start in
November 2007.Nevertheless,MiFID provides
for an expansion to further financial instru-
ments based on a review by the Commission.
A majority of German investment firms (51.2%)
rejects an expansion of the transparency
rules to any further financial instruments.
Conclusion
Many investmentfirms still collectinformation
concerning MiFID on which they will base their
decision for concrete actions. One reason for
their “wait-and-see” attitude may be due to
the fact that the technical implementation
details on the EU level are not finalized yet
(target date:September 2006) and that MiFID
has to be transformed into national legislation
(target date:January 2007).
A survey performed by the MiFID Joint
Working Group in autumn 2005 among UK
investment banks led to quite similar results.
The uncertainty was even stronger: e.g. only
24% stated that their knowledge on MiFID is
sufficient to take the necessary steps for
developing a Best Execution Policy and 80%
of the respondents had not developed a stra-
tegy for the requirements of the market
transparency regulations yet. A BearingPoint
survey in late 2005 also coincides with our
results by stating that the main potential for
competition is seen in Best Execution and
that this issue is expected to generate high
implementation costs.
Although MiFID constitutes completely new
requirements e.g. on order executions that
may provide new opportunities for firms,overall
the industry currently sees MiFID as an obli-
gation rather than a strategic chance. A fol-
low-up study after the national implementation
in early 2007 is planned to evaluate both the
attitude of firms roughly 6 months before
MiFID will go live and how the attitudes and
cost estimates have changed given the full set
of regulatory requirements and intensified
internal investigations by investment firms.
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Question: Where can you identify potential for competition for your company that might arise from the 
MiFID implementation?
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Figure 2:Potential for competition by MiFID implementation
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2Introduction
In recent years, the German banking market
has been characterized by decreasing profit-
ability (e.g., Hackethal, 2004). One reason:
Bad loans roughly totaling 300 billion euros
had been accumulated and decisive measures
were necessary to reduce this huge amount.
Thus, over 50,000 German bank employees
lost their jobs between 2001 and 2004 as the
banks attempted to make a considerable
reduction in costs. At this time, the influence
of the state-controlled banking sector with its
access to funds on preferential terms and
conditions was still quite substantial; these
public-sector institutions commanded a 40%
market share, creating a tough competitive
climate for private-sector banks. Moreover,
the situation was exacerbated by the fact
that the German economy had the lowest
growth rates in Europe. At first sight, these
facts would hardly seem likely to induce
foreign banks to consider expanding into the
German banking market. Yet, against this
background, we show how ING-DiBa has
defied the odds, rising to fourth place in the
German retail banking business in terms of
customer volume.
Business development
ING-DiBa has prospered more than any other
German bank in the last few years, and has
become Europe’s largest direct bank (accor-
ding to figures published at the end of 2004).
The very pronounced growth, which is most
obviously manifested in the amount of call
money, began in 2000. Since then, ING-DiBa
has advanced to fourth place in the German
retail banking business (after Dresdner Bank,
Deutsche Bank and Postbank) with more than
4.3 million clients. The primary engine of
growth has been the call money account
“Extra-Konto”. Furthermore, after swallowing
up the German competitor Entrium in 2003,
ING-DiBa also started to develop its personal
loan business, since Entrium, a former subsi-
diary of the leading mail-order company
Quelle, had a well developed customer base
in this segment. In addition, Entrium had a
strong market position in brokerage. The
acquisition doubled ING-DiBa’s fee income in
2003 in comparison to 2002.Hence,the diffe-
rent strengths of the two banks, ING-DiBa
with its call money account and mortgage
business and Entrium with its personal loans
and brokerage, complement one another 
very well.
A comparison with the main competitors
yields further insights into ING-DiBa’s busi-
ness development for the years 2000-2004.
First, we evaluate the call money market
share (see Figure 1). In this period, ING-DiBa
became the market leader for call money
investments by retail clients. At the end of
2004, it had a 6.27% share of the market in
this segment, which is twice the figure for
Postbank, the market leader in retail banking
as a whole.CC Bank and Citibank also succee-
ded in enlarging their market share substan-
tially, but even so, both remained short of 
1% in 2004. In contrast, Postbank, Apo Bank
and Haspa were not able to increase their 
market shares.
Second, we compare the ratio of operating
expenses to average assets as an important
efficiency measure.Due to its very large asset
volume, ING-DiBa had the lowest ratio at the
end of 2004. Starting at 1.7% in 2000, this
ratio improved to 0.81% in 2004 (see Figure 2).
Only Apo Bank achieved nearly comparable
figures, with 1.13% for 2004. Hence, we find
evidence that online banking customers
seem to be more profitable then traditional
06 researchreport
AN E-FINANCE LAB PUBLICATION    eflquarterly 03|06
Conquering the German retail 
banking market:
The case of ING-DiBa
ANDRÉ GÜTTLER ANDREAS HACKETHAL
Figure 1:Call money market share
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by Hitt and Frei (2002).
As a consequence, ING-DiBa fulfilled ING
Group’s internal profitability requirements of
18.5% RAROC (Risk Adjusted Return on
Capital) in 2004. Even in the difficult prece-
ding years, and in contrast to the majority of
German banks,ING-DiBa always operated at a
profit.Thanks to its business model as a direct
bank without any branches, ING-DiBa’s
strong growth was accompanied by only a
disproportionately small increase in its staf-
fing levels. Hence, whereas ING-DiBa’s assets
increased tenfold during our observation
period, it had to take on only four times as
many new employees.
Success factors
ING DiBa operates as a pure play direct bank
without branches. It concentrates on a nar-
row range of products with stable pricing
schemes for retail investors. This strategy
yields low variable costs,thus allowing attrac-
tive conditions to be offered.The combination
of the direct banking concept,the small num-
ber of products, and the stable pricing sche-
me provides the framework for a faultless,
user-friendly service. Moreover, the strategic
move to operate as a pure play direct bank
was supported by the increasing acceptance
and use of the Internet by retail investors.
However, their effective marketing strategy
played a key role in substantially boosting
ING-DiBa’s market share. First, ING-DiBa gre-
atly increased its marketing expenditures and
concentrated this effort on the teaser product
“Extra-Konto”. This call money account was
designed to be a viable alternative to the ordi-
nary passbook savings account, a product
which competitors had not previously used as
an instrument to attract new customers.
Since summer 2001, Extra-Konto has persi-
stently offered a higher interest rate than the
overnight interbank lending rate (see Figure
3). It appeals in particular to the many retail
investors who have become very risk averse
since the stock market bubble burst and who
are therefore willing to accept low interest
rates for risk-free investments. Customer tar-
geting takes place in the form of mailings, a
process which the bank has optimized
through state-of-the-art customer relationship
management (CRM).
In addition,the challenging demonstration of
trustworthiness was strengthened by enga-
ging the reputable sports hero Dirk Nowitzki
for advertising campaigns (see Beck at al.
(2003) or Suh and Han (2002) (for the impor-
tance of trustworthiness). However, it seems
that ING-DiBa’s success does not stem from
the existence of any particular success fac-
tors; rather, it is attributable to a favorable
combination of its hitherto unique business
model as a direct bank and the boost by the
marketing strategy of the teaser product
Extra-Konto.
In particular, the new strategic business
model has been made possible by technologi-
cal developments, specifically the Internet
and efficient call centers. It is a model which
more conventional banks with branch net-
works cannot imitate because of the heavier
burden imposed by their cost structures.ING-
DiBa has demonstrated that, with an appro-
priate strategy, retail banking services in
Germany can be provided profitably, an
accomplishment previously regarded as unfe-
asible for German banks – and for the private
domestic banks in particular – due to their
exaggerated branch networks.
In the area of marketing we detect three
main advantages for ING-DiBa. First, CRM
marketing approaches require huge databa-
ses,both in the cross-section as well as in lon-
gitude. ING-DiBa has a database of over 4.3
million customers, e.g. including their past
responses to mailings, and can therefore per-
form its marketing campaigns very efficiently.
Of course, competitors can buy extensive
databases on the open market. However, the
general customer data available might not
always be appropriate for the requirements of
a direct bank. Second, ING-DiBa has already
begun to explore its cross selling potential
within its huge customer base and is building
reliable customer relationships. Third, ING-
DiBa is now one of the most well-known and
07 researchreport
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Figure 2:Operative Expenses / Assets
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tions in Germany.These three advantages are
not forever out of reach for other competitors,
but on all counts, ING-DiBa has significant
early mover advantages.
Business model sustainability
It is questionable, however, whether 
ING-DiBa’s success will be sustainable in 
the long term. For example, car loan banks
such as Volkswagen Bank have successfully
copied its strategy. These mostly new banks
have the advantage of being able to 
implement the most modern IT systems from
the outset, whereas ING-DiBa is still using
relatively old-fashioned IT systems for some
of its operations. However, such new 
competitors must first win a vast number 
of customers before they can benefit from
scale effects. Traditional banks will also 
react to the increasing possibilities of 
the Internet.
Nevertheless, we do not expect these banks
to become main competitors to ING-DiBa
(and other direct banks) due to their cost
disadvantages. Such banks with branch 
networks have also begun to offer more 
favorable terms in an attempt to compete
with ING-DiBa and other direct banks.
However, it would seem impossible for 
traditional banks to compete with the 
direct banks’ terms and conditions in the 
long run while continuing to maintain their
branch networks with their less favorable 
cost structures. The direct banks’ target
customers,who are exceedingly cost sensitive
and “Internet affine”, seem to be lost to 
the traditional banks with branch networks.
A major dilemma for these banks is the 
growing pressure on them to introduce
Internet facilities into their services, both 
due to customer demand and for cost-cutting
reasons: doing so, however, effectively trains
their customers to use the Internet,
which increases the likelihood of their 
switching to ING-DiBa or another direct bank.
Furthermore, the advantage of a branch 
network in terms of accessibility and 
quality of service diminishes with every
branch closure. Moreover, the coexistence 
of direct banks and traditional banks 
with branch networks could lead to adverse
selection:clients might leave only the person-
nel-intensive business to the traditional
banks, where the latter can only lose money.
For example, customers seeking standard
mortgages might favor direct banks because
they offer a better deal, while the more 
complex mortgages, e.g. those involving
some form of government aid, remain 
with the traditional banks.
Conclusion
ING-DiBa has attained a very strong 
position in the German retail banking market
through a coherent marketing and IT-based
business strategy. Since traditional banks
with branch networks are not able to imitate
the successful business model of direct
banks, we expect in the future to see price-
oriented direct banks that offer a clearly 
defined range of services coexisting alongside
advice-oriented banks with branch networks
(Howcroft et al.,2002).
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Figure 3:Comparison of interest rates
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In October 1998,the Long-Term Credit Bank of
Japan, the predecessor of Shinsei Bank, was
temporarily nationalized under the provisions
of the Financial Revitalization Law. While in
nationalization, the bank implemented
management policies to fully resolve its non-
performing loan issues and undertake the
rationalization of its operations. In March
2000, ownership of the bank was transferred
to New LTCB Partners,an investor group esta-
blished by influential financial institutions in
Europe and the United States.The temporary
nationalization ended June 5,2000,the bank's
name was changed to Shinsei Bank,Limited.
What did you do to transform the bank?
Shinsei now is recognized as one of the most
impressive turnaround stories in Japan. The
key focus was on building a platform which,
among other things,involved:
• Creating a dedicated group to work out
the $20B+ of non-performing loans.
• Establishment of a PC and server based
scalable technology platform that does
not utilize a mainframe.
• Major hiring efforts to attract talent
and experience.
• The establishment of a retail bank.
• Creation of a solutions based business
model for institutional banking.
Also,following the IPO in 2004,Shinsei entered
a phase of revenue generation focusing on
quality and diversification of earning streams.
In doing so,Shinsei Bank (see Figure 1):
• Became a leader in innovative solutions
such as Non-Recourse Lending and Secu-
ritization and established Consumer and
Commercial Finance as a third strategic
business pillar to complement the exi-
sting Institutional Banking and Retail
Banking Groups.
• Focused on customer needs by integra-
ting product specialists with relationship
managers.
• Increased cross-selling to both institu-
tional and retail customers.
• Developed business intelligence capabi-
lities, including customer segmentation
using customer relationship manage-
ment systems.
What is new in institutional banking?
Shinsei’s Institutional Banking Group is a uni-
que hybrid investment and corporate banking
model that offers an integrated and customer-
focused approach in which product specialists
and customer relationship managers work to-
gether to provide not only corporate loans but
also value-added solutions to our institutional
customers.Those innovative solutions include
securitization,credit trading,non-recourse len-
ding to new growth areas such as capital mar-
kets distribution, loan syndication, asset
management,and wealth management.
What is new in retail banking?
Shinsei’s retail banking offers unique cus-
tomer-focused value with innovative pro-
ducts, flexible and convenient service and an
efficient “bricks and clicks”distribution model.
The distribution model has enabled rapid
customer growth to take place mainly through
cost-efficient remote channels while allowing
branches to focus on providing personal and
financial advise and handling higher value
transactions.
How is the bank positioned today?
As previously mentioned, we have developed
three strategic business pillars; Institutional
Banking, Retail Banking, and Consumer and
Commercial Finance.It is clearly a different type
of Japanese bank.We pride ourselves on being
more global than local banks in terms of range
of solutions offered and more local than global
banks in terms of our long-standing customer
relationships.
You are engaged in the German NPL joint ven-
ture. What is the purpose and who are the
partners?
We set up a joint venture with NORD/LB and
WestLB for non-performing loans in September
2005. The joint venture, named SGK (Service-
gesellschaft Kreditmanagement GmbH), was
the first company in Germany’s public sector
banking industry to offer the purchase and
restructuring of non-performing loans. This
joint venture exemplifies our international
strategy, which is to leverage the knowledge
and expertise from our home market in Japan
with excellent partners in overseas markets.
We have had very successful experiences with
clean-up of our own non-performing loans
and investing in those assets in Japan, Korea,
and Taiwan. We believe we can leverage that
expertise in the German market.
What is the reason to set up your subsidiary in
Frankfurt?
Frankfurtis a financial center and provides good
access to most of the major markets in the
country.
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Shinsei Bank – Successful 
turnaround and expanding its 
business in Central Europe
Clark D.Graninger,Executive Vice President,
Head of Institutional Banking Group
Shinsei Bank,Tokyo
Figure 1: Approach to the revenue generation of 
Shinsei Bank
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selected efinance lab publications news
Heiko Gewald (IBM,Cluster 1) finished his Ph.D. thesis
Heiko Gewald – member of the cooperative Ph.D. program in
Cluster 1 – finished his Ph.D. research on "Assessing the Benefits
and Risks of Business Process Outsourcing in the German Banking
Industry". He will re-join his employer IBM as Managing
Consultant responsible for Business Value from Technology in
IBM's Technology Strategy practice.
Roger Needham Award and Best Paper Award 
Dr.-Ing. Oliver Heckmann (Cluster 2) received the Roger Needham EuroSys Award 2006 for
his thesis "A System-oriented Approach to Efficiency and Quality of Service for Internet
Service Providers" in Leuven,Belgium.
Thorsten Wiesel (Cluster 3), currently visiting scholar at Goizueta Business School (Atlanta,
USA) won together with his co-authors Prof. Skiera and Prof. Villanueva the award for the
best conference paper “Decomposition of Changes in Customer Equity over Time” at the
European Marketing Association Conference (EMAC 2006).
Appointments as Assistant Professors
In September 2006, Martin Böhm (Cluster 3) will join the Marketing Department of the
Instituto de Empresa at Madrid as an Assistant Professor and Thorsten Wiesel (Cluster 3) will
join the Marketing Department of the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam as an Assistant
Professor, too.
Nomination for Best Paper Award
Heinz-Theo Wagner and Tim Weitzel (both Cluster 1) with their paper "Operational IT
Business Alignment as the Missing Link from IT Strategy to Firm Success" and Heiko Gewald
and Phil Yetton's with their study "Differences in Benefit Perception According to Alternative
Statuses of Business Process Outsourcing Adoption" have been nominated for Best Paper
Award at the 12th Americas Conference on Information Systems (AMCIS 2006).
3
rd Meeting of MiFID Joint Working Group (JWG) hosted by Cluster 5
On July 12th,Cluster 5 hosted the third plenary meeting of the MiFID JointWorking Group at
Campus Westend and delivered an information session on the latest MiFID developments.
The E-Finance Lab Fall conference 2006 “Customer Management in Retail Banking”
The E-Finance Lab Fall conference 2006 “Future trends of customer management in retail
banking” will be held at the Westend Campus of the Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt, at 28th
of September 2006.For further information and registration see www.efinancelab.de.11 infopool
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RESEARCH PAPER: A REVIEW OF TRADING COST MODELS: REDUCING 
TRANSACTION COSTS
Until recently, the focus of the investment community has been on fixed trading costs although
implicit costs (e.g. market impact, price appreciation, etc.) make the lion's share of the overall
costs. In this article the authors have focused on these so-called “hidden” transaction costs and
take the reader from the very early attempts of modeling market microstructure to some state-
of-the art techniques used today.Thus, this article provides a perfect starting point for entering
the exciting field of Transaction Cost Analysis.
Freyre-Sanders,Andrew,Guobuzaite,Renate,and Byrne,Kevin
In:Algorithmic Trading:Precision,Control,Execution,2005.
RESEARCH STUDY: BANK & ZUKUNFT 2006
In 2006,banks continue to expect further intensification of competition,especially in the field of
standardized products and services.This firstly requires intensive analysis of industrial methods
of process management, which contribute to increase the general efficiency of banks and thus
their competitiveness. Secondly, this also serves to create room for innovation processes in the
banks which will be utilised to intensify marketing activities.The primary goal of such measures
is a more intensive relation with the customers through long-term service approaches. In addi-
tion to this, innovative distribution concepts should serve to initiate spontaneous contacts to
customers,with improved processes and a stronger sales approach on the part of the employees
allowing for a simpler and faster purchase of products.
The banks of the future therefore combine efficiency and innovation as equal parts of a business
development concept.
Spath,Dieter,Engstler,Martin,Praeg,Claus-Peter,and Vocke,Christian
Stuttgart,Germany,2006.
RESEARCH PAPER: CUSTOMER ACQUISITION PROMOTIONS AND CUSTOMER ASSET
VALUE
The author addresses the question of how a firm’s acquisition efforts influence the composition
of the customer portfolio. The first part is a conceptual model that illustrates how customer
uncertainty provides an explanation for why promotionally acquired customers have smaller life-
time values.The second part of the research involves empirical analyses of customer-level data.
The author shows that acquisition discount depth is negatively related to customer asset value.
For example, a 35% acquisition discount results in customers with about one-half the long-term
value of non-promotionally acquired customers.
Lewis,Michael
In:Journal of Marketing Research 43 (2006) 2,pp.195-203.
electronic newsletter
Das E-Finance Lab betreibt zwei Typen von Newslettern, die beide quartalsweise erscheinen,
sodass alle sechs Wochen die jeweils andere Art herauskommt. Bei dem hier vorliegenden
gedruckten Newsletter steht die Beschreibung der Ergebnisse zweier Forschungsprojekte des 
E-Finance Lab im Zentrum – ergänzt durch ein Interview und weitere Kurzinformationen. Zur
Subskription senden Sie bitte eine E-Mail an: eflquarterly@efinancelab.com oder ihre
Visitenkarte mit der Notiz „bitte gedruckten Newsletter zusenden“ an:
Prof.Dr.Wolfgang König
E-Finance Lab,Universität Frankfurt
Mertonstr.17,60054 Frankfurt
Der elektronische Newsletter hingegen setzt mehr auf kurze Anmoderationen und den Einsatz
von Hyperlinks zu weiterführenden Ressourcen.Zur Subskription senden Sie bitte eine E-Mail an:
newsletter@efinancelab.com
Viele weitere Informationen finden Sie unter www.efinancelab.com.
research outside the efinance lab